Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1960

Florence Schweitzer v. Harvey Stone et al : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Howell, Stine and Olmstead; Richard W. Campbell; Attorneys for Intervenor and Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Schweitzer v. Stone, No. 9215 (Utah Supreme Court, 1960).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/3615

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

No. 9215

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF

T! L E 0
-

\ocTG-i96D
__ ............

FLORENCE SCHWEITZER,

--------Ci~~k-: s~;;;;;;~ cz·~;i, 0;·~:.
Plaintiff and Respondent

vs.
HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCKING COMPANY,
LLOYD V. HIGGINBOTHAM AND WE(STERN
AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY,
Defendants and .Appellants
vs.
, IVAN SHEFFY,
Intervenor and Respondent

Respondent's Brief
Howell, Stine and Olmstead and
Richard W. Campbell
Attorneys for Intervenor and
Respondent
2324 Adams Ave,. Ogden, Utah

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

..,~·...-~

INDEX

Page
I.

STATE~IENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------ 1

II.

STATEMENT OF POINTS ---------------------------------- 1

III. ARGUMENT ______ ____ __ __________________ ________ ______ ______ ____________ 2
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR APPELLANTS OR IN REFUSING TO GRANT A
NEW TRIAL ------------ _____________________ .__ _________ ____ __ ___ __ ____ __ ____ ____ __ 2
II. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR
IN REFUSING TO ADMIT EXHIBIT H-30
INTO EVIDEN CEI -------------------------------------------------------------- 9
IV. CON CL.USIO N ------------ ____________ ,. _________________________________ 18
AUTHORITIES CITED
Baldwin vs. Ewing, 204 P. 2nd 430 ------------------------------------ 7
Brown vs. Parker, 233 S.W. 2nd 64 -------------------------------- 6
Flusk vs. Erie R. Co., 110 F. Supp. 118 ------------------------ 9
Gibbs vs. Blue Cab Co., 122 Ut. 312, 249 P. 2d 213. _______ 3

Hess vs. Robinson, 163 P. 2d 510 ------------------------------------ 3
Hillyard vs. Utah By-Products, 1 Ut. 2d
143, 263 P. 2d 287 ------------------------------------------------------------ 4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page
McMurdie vs. Underwood, 9·Ut. 2d
400, 346 P. 2d 711 ---------------------------------------------------------- 4
McWilliams Dredging Co. vs. U.S.,
.J
105 F. Supp. 582 _____________________ -------------------- _______________ ._____14
Olender vs. U.S., 210 F. 2d 795, 42 A.L.R. 2d 736 __________ 10
Startin vs. Mads'en, 120 U t. 631, 237 P. 2d 834 --------------17
State vs. Lawrence, 120 Ut. 323, 234 P. 2d 600 ______________ 16
Van Cedarfield vs. Laroche, 252 F. 2nd 117 __________________ 14
20 Am. J ur. Evidence, Section 1026 ---------------------------·----13
20 Am. J ur. Evidence, Section 1027 ________________________________ 12
32 C. J. S. Evidence, Section 673 b --------------------------------10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
FLORENCE SCHWEITZER,
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

HARVEY STONE, S & I TRUCKING COMPANY,
LLOYD V. HIGGINBOTHAM AND WE,STERN
AUTO TRANSPORT COMPANY,
Defendants and Appellants
vs.

IVAN SHEFFY,
Intervenor and Respondent

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellants statement of Facts are essentially correct, but as hereinafter supplemented and in some instances controverted.

STATE1IENT OF POINTS
I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR APPELLANTS OR
IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL ..
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO ADMIT EXHIBIT H-30 INTO EVIDENCE.
.

.
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III.

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL· COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO DIRECT A VERDICT FOR APPELLANTS OR
IN REFUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL.
Appellants cite 49 (b) U.R.C.P. to support their
contention. This rule is of no import here, because in
the instant case we have these findings relative to appellants liability to Sheffy:
1. Higginbotham was found n:egligent.
Verdict, QII) .

(Special

2. Higginbotham's negligence was found to be a
proximate cause of the collision. (Special Verdict, Q. II).
3. Sheffy was found to be negligent.
dict, Q III) .

(Special Ver-

4. Sheffy's negligence was found not to he a proximate cause of his injuries. {Special Verdict,
Q III).
5. Sheffy was found to have suffered damage of
Four Thousand Five Hundred ($4,500.00) Dollars. (Special Verdict, Q VC).
These findings ar>e consistent \vith each other and
consistent with the general verdict. Since there is no
inconsistency between the findings and the verdict,
Rule 49 (b) does not apply; or if it does, it requires
the court to direct the entry of the appropriate judgment as was done in this case.
2
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Evidence submitted to the JUry included the following:
The rear of th:e Stone truck had five clearance
lights, 2 large reflectors, and a taillight. (Tr. 255-256).
All these lights were operating properly a few minutes
before the collision ( Tr. 257), and were lighted while
Stone and Sheffy were working on the truck. (Tr. 79).·
The truck was on a slight angle, but within the
outside lane (Tr. 87). The jury found Stone was not
negligent in the matter of parking the truck. (Special
Verdict Q I).
Sheffy had previously experienced stalling becaus.e
of switching tanks and thought it would be safer .to
start the truck and get out of there than to take time
setting out flares, since he anticipated it would take
just a f:ew moments to get it running. (Tr. 308).
There is 8/lOths of a mile visibility to the west, the
direction Appellant's truck was approaching. (Pre trial
order, R-25 ). Higginbotha1n didn't see the truck until
he was just 70 .feet away, although there wer~e no obstructions, other cars passing, or emergencies or distractions. ( Tr. 92, 93, 94).
Sheffy was at the truck working for one-half minute
to one minute when the accident happened. (Tr. 265).
The question of proximate cause is in nearly all
cases a question for the jury. Hess v. Robinson, 163 P.
2d 510. Appellant cites Gibbs v. Blue Cab, 122 Ut. 312,
249 P. 2d 213, to support the contention that Sheffy's
negligence was as a matter of law the proximate cause.
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In the Gibbs case, contributory negligence and proximate cause were held for the jury, on the basis -that
even if there had been a light on decedent's bicycle, the
car driver may not have seen it. The same situation
exists here-if Higginbotham could not see a white,
25,000 lbs. truck and tractor with refl:ectors and clearance lights, could he have seen a flare 1 In this connection it should be noted that the physical evidence gave
no corroboration to Higginbotham's claim that he saw
the truck at 70 feet, and tried to avoid it. ( Tr. 152, 156).
This case is a clear example of the situation referred
to by this court in the cases Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Ut. 2d 143, 263 P. 2d 287, and McMurdie vs
Underwood, 9 Ut. 2, 400, 346 P. 2, 711, as follows:
"In applying the test of forese:eability to situations where a negligently created preexisting
condition combines with a later act of negligence
causing an injury, the courts have drawn a clearcut distinction between two classes of cases. The
first situation is where one has negligently created a dangerous condition (such as parking the
truck) and a later actor observed, or circumstances are such that he could not fail to observe,
but negligently failed to avoid it. The second
situation involves conduct of a later intervening
actor who negligently failed to observe the dangerous condition until it is too late to avoid
it. In regard to the first situation it is held as a
matter of law that the later intervening act do·es
interrupt the natural sequence of events and cut
off the legal effect of the negligence of the initial
actor. This is based upon the reasoning that it is
not reasonably to be forseen or expected that one
who actually becomes cognizant of a dangerous
4 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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condition in atnple time to avert injury will fail
to do so. On the other hand, with respect.. to .the·
second situation, where the second actor fails to
s~e the danger in time to avoid it, it is held that
a jury question exists, based on the rationale that
it can reasonably be anticipated that circumstances may arise vvherein others may not observe
the dangerous condition until too late to escap:e
it. The distinction is basicaHy one between a
situation in which the second actor has sufficient
time, after being charged with knowledge of the
hazard, to avoid it, and one in which th:e second
actor negligently becomes confronted with an
emergency situation."
The serious question would seem to be· whether
Higginbotham's negligence was not th e sole proximate
cause as a matter of law, under the McMurdie and Hill_.
yard cases. Certainly there is no basis for asserting,
as appellant does, that no evidence of intervening caus·e
exists.
1

The conclusion from this must b~ that if there were
an independent suit, with Sheffy and Appell~nts the
only parties, the jury's findings and verdict are supported by the evidence and would be unquestionably upheld. The reason this should not be done here, it is
claimed, is a seeming discrepancy bet\ve'en the jury findings as to Stone and as to Sheffy.
.In point of fact, Sheffy's lawsuit is separate and
distinguishable from the other suits here tried. ·Sheffy,
as a plaintiff in intervention, was allowed to intervene
under 24 (b), U.R.C.P., because his lawsuit inv.olved a
~ommon question of .law o~ fact, i.e., the n~gligence of
Iliggil):botham. This is the . same. criteria .. used to de-
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termine if actions should be consolidated .under 42 (a)
U.R.C.P.
When the inconsistent findings arise between findings of the same jury in two different lawsuits, the
verdict need not be consistent. Brown vs. Parker,
Arkansas, 1950, 233 S.W. 2d 64 is in point. This case
involved a three car intersection collision, and two resulting actions were consolidated for trial. In one action,
the driver of the northbound car recovered from the
driver of the west bound car, thus being a finding of
negligence against the west-bound driver. There was
no evidence of any negligence on the part of the eastbound car, yet the same jury returned a verdict against
the east-bound driver on his suit against the same westbound driver. In answering the claim of an inconsistent
verdict, the Arkansas Supreme Court said:
"The answer to this argument must be that the
law imposes no requirement of consistency upon
jurors hearing separate cases which are consolidated for purposes of trial. If such separate
cases were being tried separately, by different
juries, there would be no assurance of consistency
in the verdicts, and no greater assurance of consistency is insisted upon when one jury tries both
cases together. As this Court said in Leech v.
Missouri Pac. R. Co., 189 Ark. 161, 164, 71 S.W.
2d 467, 468; 'It does not follow, however, that because two separate and distinct causes of action
are tried by the same jury that the findings of
facts in one cause is binding on the jury in the
otller cause of action if there is a dispute in the
testimony. Although there was evidence tending
to show concurrent negligence on the part of
Graham and appellee and no negligence on the

6
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part of the deceased, yet there was evidence tending to show no negligence on the part of appellee,
and the jury was at liberty to so find in the cause
of action on behalf of appellant for the benefit
of herself and son, as much so as if the two
caus'es of action had been tried separately instead of together. Notwithstanding the causes
of action may be tried together under the provisions of the statute, they are wholly independent
of each other, and tile finding of the jury in one
is not binding upon the jury in the other if the
facts are in dispute as they were in this case.' To
the same effect, see Green v. W'est Memphis
Lumber Co., 192 Ark. 1177, 91 S.W. 2d 261."
The Idaho Supreme Court has ruled on a similar
situation in Baldwin v. Ewing, 1949, 204 P 2d 430. In
this case a minor, John H. Baldwin (by his guardian)
filed an action against defendant for injuries rec'eived
in an auton1obile accident. The minor's father Matthew
Bald\vin, in a separate suit filed an action for special
damages incurred. The two cases were consolidated and
tried to a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the father, and against the minor. The trial Court
granted a motion for new trial, and upon appeal the
Supre1ne Court affirmed the original jury verdicts :
"It is urged by respondent, John H. Baldwin, that:
" 'Having rendered a verdict in favor of l\fatthew
Baldwin for the full amount for which he sued
was clearly an expression on the part of the jury
that the defendant, Ewing, was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the collision,· and
that John H. Baldwin was not guilty of contributing (contributory) negligence which was a
proximate cause of said collision, and that the
7
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said John H. Baldwin did not have the last clear
chance to prevent the coJlision.'
"It is apparent that it was on the theory stated
in the foregoing quotation that the motion for a
new trial was made, and upon \vhich the trial
court acted in granting the new trial.
"It must be kept in mind that, while the two cases
were consolidated for the purpose of trial, they
remain two separate and distinct cases, both in
law and in fact. Let us assume, only for the
purpose of illustrating the point, that the cases
had been tried separately and by a differ'ent jury,
or the same jury. Could it be successfully contended that the finding of the jury in either of
the cases would be binding upon the jury in the
other case 1· We think not. And the fact that
the jury may have reached a different conclusion
on the question of negligence her·e does not violate
the rule as to such finding."
Thus, we submit that even if the findings as to
Sheffy were to be deemed inconsistent with th'e findings as to Stone, nevertheless Sheffy is entitled to have
a jury pass upon his lawsuit, and as long the the evid'ence supports the findings and judgment as to Sheffy
that judgment may not be overturned.
The next question considered is whether there in
reality is any inconsistency in the jury findings. The
findings here attacked ar'e findings as to two separate
individuals, under different duties, and doing different
acts. Stone was found negligent of (1) running out of
gas, and (2) failing to have lights on or flares about
his truck. Sheffy, on the other hand, was found negligent in (1) exposing hims'elf to a hazard, and (2) failS
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ing to keep a lookout. Stone's negligent acts were
found to be a proximate cause of the collision and
Shf\ffy's negligence was found not to have proximately
contributed to his injuries. The jury was instructed on
proximate cause, negligence, contributory negligence
and all other essential matters, and the evidence supports the jury verdict.
The cas·es cited by appellants are of no persuasion
here, because they deal only with situations where the
jury finds the same act of the same individual to be
negligent and non-negligent.
The findings and verdict of the jury should be upheld if it can reasonably be done. 89 C.J.S. Trial, Sec.
562. As was said in the case of Flusk vs Erie R. Co.
1953, U.S.D.C., 110 F. Supp. 118:
~'Doubtless

because of the unusual situation here
presented, wher'e, two actions were tried together,
with a general verdict in one and a special verdict
in the other, this court has been referred to no
precedents dir'ectly in point. But it would seem
that, if any inconsistency between verdicts in
two different cases is to be considered at all, as
to which there is question, the strict rule pertin·ent to a single case should be applied, a fortiori,
i.e., that the validity of these two verdicts in
these separate cases should be upheld unless they
are irreconcilably in conflict.''

II.

THE TRIAL COURrr DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO ADMIT EXHIBIT H-30 INTO EVIDENCE.
9
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At the .outset -it should be obse-rved that although
Appellants .call attention to United. St~tes .Constitution
and to Federal Statutes relating to recognition by one
State of the public acts and records of another State,
they make no claim that 28 U.S.C.A., Section 1739 is
here applicable. This is because the formal requirements
of that section were not met by Exhibit H-30, and
accordingly, the admissibility of the document is determined solely by Utah law and practice. 32 C.J.S
Evidence Section 673 b.
To determine the question under Utah law, we submit three matters must be considered:
(1) Were the records offered "official records" or
"official documents" so as to come under the provisions
of -Rule 44a, U.R.C.P.1
One case that is enlightening, is Olender v. United
States, 210 F. 2d 795 42 ALR 2d 736, where the government attempted to introduce the files of the State W elfare department into evidence. In holding them inadmissible, the Court said:
"There remains the inter'esting question whether
the file (Ex. 55) should have been excluded as
hearsay. The file was introduced and ·received
in evidence under the official docu1nents ·exception to the hearsay rule. This exception to the hearsay rule was recognized at comm.on law. (Cases
cited) For official docu1nents of the United
. States Govern1nent the ~exception is now.·provided

10
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for in 28 USCA, Sec. 1733, which is made applicable to criminal cases by Rule 27, Fed. Rules
Crim. Pr&c., 18 USCA. As has been pointed out,
however, this statute deals primarily with the
m'ethod of proof of official documents and is of
no aid in determining what kinds of official documents are admissible. (Cases cited) Such questions must be worked out in accordance with the
principles of the common law 'as they may be
interpreted by tlle courts of the United States in
the light of reason and experience'. Rule 26
Fed. Rules Crim. Prac., 18 USCA. For purposes
of applying the rule no difference has be'en recognized between documents of federal, state and
county governments. (Cases cited),
"Gen'eTally stated, the rule is that all documents
prepared by public official pursuant to a duty
imposed by law or required by the nature of
their offices are admissible as proof of the facts
stated therein. (Cases cited) The r'eason of
the rule is that it would be burdensome and inconvenient to call public officials to appear in
the myriad cases in which their testimony might
be required in a court of law, and that records
and reports prepared by such officials in the
course of their duties are generally trustworthy.
(Cases cited)"
"Since the official documents are a substitute for
the p~ersonal appearance of the official in court,
it is generally held that such documents, to be
admissible, must concern matters to which the
official could testify if he were called to the
witness stand. (Cases cited) Thus, this circuit
and most of th·e other circuits which have passed
on the question have held that the facts stated
in the documents must have been within the
11
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personal ·knowledge and observation· of ':the re··' ... cordi:q.g.:official.or ~-his. subordinates;; and:·:that r'e.. ports based .upon· .general investigations and upon
. information gleaned second hand: from random
sources must be excluded. (Cases cited)"
"The documents in Government Exhibit 55 may
be divided into two groups. The first group consists of the documents prepared by persons and
firms outside the public agency concerned-the
statements and affidavits of 1\'Irs. Foote, Mrs.
· Olender and the five banks The second group
consists of the .records, the reports prepared by
investigators and officials of the l3'resilo · County
Public Welfare Department."
"The documents in the first group. were clearly
outside the official document rule. They were
not prepared by public officials pursuant to the
duties of their offices."
The documents offered in th·e trial of our case are
similar in nature to the ones declined in the Olender
Case, since they were not prepared by any public official
in tlle course of his duties.. The record offered was a
statement by the attending physician and a fee bill.
The mere fact that a paper is kept in a public file does
not render it an official record within the meaning of
the rul e. As is stated in 20 American Jurisprudence,
Evidence, Sec. 1027:
1

"The ·report of an accident tnade to a public official "bY a person involved therein, in pursuance
of a statutory duty, is_ generally~ not admissible
in. evidence at th'e trial. There:- is, how~ver, a
wid~ differ_ence between a report 1nade by a
private citizen to a public officer, .th_ough made

12
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compulsory by statute, and one made by a public
official in th·e performance of his duty; reliance
can safely be placed on the action of the latter,
taken under the sanction of his office, but not a
report made by a private citizen."
Again, American Jurisprudence states the general
law regarding records or reports at Sec. 1026.
"There is no rule prescribing the precise character of records, reports, and other documents which
are admissible under the exception to the hearsay
ru1e, which permits the use in evidence of records
and 'reports of administrative officers. The
courts hold to be admissible a great variety of
books, registers, records, and other official writings. It may be stated as a broad gen'e ral rule
that any book of entry, record, or report made by
such officers in the discharge of a public and
official duty imposed upon them by statute by
the nature of the office or by a superior officer
is admissible, provided of course it is relevant
and material to the controversy at hand."
It will be noted that all three of the cases appellants
cite in this connection deal with the writings and reports of public officials. Federal and State Analysts
in the Hardison case, experts of the U. S. Bureau of
Mines in the Moran case, and Federal Narcotic Agents
and clients in the Ware case. In all 3 cases, the safeguard set up by the requirement that the r~eport be made
by a public official in the course of his duties were met.
These requirements were not met in our cas;e. There
is no evidence in the record that Wyoming law requires
the attending physician to make the reports in H-30 to
the Director of W orkmens Compensation.

13
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_. _ 2. Di~ the offered records comply with· the requirements of 44a U.R.C.P. ~ ..·This r.ule···pr.ovides::.for two
separate qualifications:
....

First, the copy must be attested by the offic.er having
custody of the original, or his deputy, ·and
Second, it must be accompanied by a certificat_e
that such officer has the custody, such certificate to
be made (in this case) by any public officer having a
seal of office and having official duties in the district
where the record is kept, authenticated by the· seal of
his office.
Rule 44A, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is
identical to our rule on thes·e requirements. This rule
was considered in McWilliams Dr'edging Co. v U.S.,
105 F. Supp. 582. In this case the certification was:
"A true copy of the original,
I certify
A. A. Genter (Signature)
Ass't Coli. of Customs"
The court held this insufficient, saying "under Rule 44
of the Civil Rules, these photostats should have been
accompanied with a certificate that the attesting officer
had the custody of these records."
A very
in Van
. similar situation was considered
.
.
Cedarfield v. Laroche, 252 F. 2, 817. In thi~ case the
appellants offered a photostatic copy_ of an application
for title of a car, for the purpose of sh~wing_ ownership of the car involved in a collision. By 'vay ·of
authentication, they offered a certificate bearing the

14
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signature of a section chief acting for Robert A. Theobald, the Director of Revenue of Colorado, certifying
the attached document was a true copy of an original
on file in his department; and a certificate by the Secretary of State of Colorado under the great seal of the
state certifying as to the correctness of an attached
executive order appointing Theobald Director of
Revenue. The Court held the document inadmissible,
(upon the ground that thH certificate lacked the seal
of the office of Director of Revenue) and in doing so
said that since the Secretary of State's certificate did
not certify that the Director of Revenue had custody of
the records, the requirements of 44a were not met.
In the instant case, one certificate attempted to
satisfy both requirements of attestation and certification. The rule clearly contemplates and requires
attestation by one person together with a certificate
by another official that the first person has custody.
The dual requirements of rule would be defeated if
one official were allowed to attest the instrument and
also certify that he has legal custody. In point of
fact, there· is no certification that the attesting officer
(Wm. P. Petry) has custody of the records offered;
there is only his certificate that the record is a copy of
a like document in the files of the department. This
is not in any way the equivalent of a certificate by a
public officer that the attesting officer (Wm. P. Petry)
has the custody of the original document.
Appellants assert the court should have taken judicial notice that Wm. P. Petry had custody of the document in question. No offer of proof as to Wyoming
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law was made. The suggestion is made that Wyomi;r:1g
~~w will be presumed to .be the same as. Utah law.. 'In
this connection, it is to be _noted that Utah does not
even have a Director of W orkment Compensation.
Under 78-25-1, U.C.A. 1953, !eight categories of facts that
judicial knowledge will be taken of are listed. Of course,
our situation does not come under any one of them. The
case of State v. Lawrence, 120 Ut. 323, 234 P. 2 600, is
cited as holding that this statute is not ;exclusive, and
that judicial knowledge will be taken of other facts as
well.. In the Lawrence case the court spoke as follows:
"The word 'knowledge' in the foregoing section
is appar;ently used advisedly, there being a distinction between 'judicial knowledge' of the public records, laws, etc. which the court is deemed
to know by virtue of his office and 'judicial notice'
of things which are commonly known."
It should further be noted that Rule 44 (a) tefers
to judicial knowledge, not judicial notice, and 78-25-1
U.C.A. 1953 outlines judicial knowledge with respect
to public and official acts and duties. The conclusion
fro1n this, we submit, is that absent judicial knowledge,
as set out in 78-25-1, U.C.A. 1953, there must be either
(1) competent evidence of the custody of the attesting
officer, or (2) that the attesting officer has custody.
Since neither requirement was met, the standards of
admission were not complied with under Rule 44 (a).
3. Even if the Exhibit H-30 is admissible evidence,

was its exclusion

prejudicial~

Rule 61, U.R.C.P., provides "No error_ in * ~ the
exclusion of evidence • * * is ground for -granting .. a
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new trial • • • unless refusal to take such action appears
to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The
court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard
any error or defect in the proceeding which does not
affect the substantial rights of the parties.', Before
appellant is 'entitled to prevail, he must show both error
and prejudice. Starlin v. Madsen, 120 Ut. 631, 237 P.
2d 834. With that in mind, let us examine the nature
of the excluded evidence.
The report of Dr. Robert Knapp of Pinedale, Wyoming, 'vas off'ered by Sheffy as medical testimony concerning his injuries. This consisted of two hand written
small pages, stating the examinatons made, the negative
x-rays, that apparently the soft tissue damage would
improve no further, and that a five (5%) percent partial disability would attach. This report was written
December 7, 1958, based on a last examination of December 6, 1958. Counsel for Western Auto introduced
a report from Dr. Lamb, noted orthopedist in Salt Lake
City, this report being based on an examination and
study of x-rays made October 20, 1959·. Dr. Lamb found
impairment still present, but gave as his opinion that
it would not be permanent.
The offered Exhibit H-30 contained reports made
between April and August, 1957, over a year prior to
Dr. Knapp's report of December 6, 1958, and over two
years prior to the examination of Dr. Lamb. In fact,
the reports in H-30 are not necessarily inconsistent with
the December 6, 1958 report of Dr. Knapp. H-30 shows
that during treatment of the injury, up to August 1957,
Dr. Knapp considered the injury not permanent; on
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D,ecember 6, 1958 upon final examination he concluded
there would be no complete recovery. .He .characterized
it as a "minor" impairment.
Thus counsel for appellant had full advantage of
arguing the more recent report of their specialist
against the year old report of Dr. Knapp and admission
of Exhibit H-30 would have given the jury no further
evidence for their deliberations and would in fact have
offered only a slight basis for arguing contradictory
statements or impeachment.
We submit that even if the docu1nents were admissible their exclusion has not been demonstrated by appellant to have been prejudicial or to have deprived them
of any substantial rights.
CONCLUSION
Respondent submits that the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in refusing to direct a verdict
and in refusing to grant appellants a new trial. The
evidence amply supports the verdict and the judgment
and in the interests of substantial justice should he
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
Howell, Stine and Olmstead and
Richard W. Ca1npbell
Attorneys for lnte'rvenor and
Respondent.
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